EJSP2009 Stouten De Cremer Van Dijk
This peer-reviewed article (Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2009) examines how asymmetries in financial interest (different shares of a public-good bonus) interact with social acceptance versus rejection to shape emotional (anger, frustration, hostility) and behavioral (contributions, desire to leave, retribution) responses in public-good dilemmas. Across two experiments, the authors show that social rejection makes low-interest group members—especially proselfs—more likely to experience negative emotions, reduce contributions, desire exit, and seek revenge; prosocials are less affected. Experiment 2 further demonstrates mediation of behavioral responses by negative emotions and uses social value orientation (Decomposed Games) as a moderator.
Questions this document answers
67 undergraduate students (paid €7 each).
Each participant had 75 points endowment; group threshold = 120 points; group bonus = 300 points; bonus shares manipulated as 33% vs 17% per member.
108 participants initially; classified: prosocials = 31, individualists = 28, competitors = 15, unclassified = 13; proselfs (individualists+competitors) combined n = 43.
Experiment 1: anger scale (anger + frustration), Cronbach's α = .83. Experiment 2: negative emotion scale (anger, irritation, fear, hostility), Cronbach's α = .88. Retribution scale (2 items) r = .85, p < .001.