26-06-29-CKN-Beyond-Borders
The report, produced by the China Knowledge Network (CKN) and the Leiden Asia Centre for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, analyses how the People’s Republic of China employs a suite of foreign‑interference tactics to target three Dutch strategic sectors – semiconductors, maritime, and aerospace. Using an "Interference Chain" framework, the authors map entry points (talent‑based espionage, cyber‑enabled theft, economic statecraft, legal pressure) to concrete scenarios, assess probability and impact, and produce sector‑specific risk tables. The analysis shows that while the semiconductor sector faces very high strategic risk, maritime is high risk and aerospace moderate‑to‑high, each driven by dual‑use technologies, supply‑chain dependencies on critical raw materials, and open research ecosystems that facilitate talent‑based technology transfer. Cross‑sectoral synthesis highlights recurring patterns: openness, digitalisation, and fragmented governance create blind spots that China exploits. The report argues that Chinese interference threatens Dutch strategic autonomy, the nation’s governance model, and its role within NATO and the EU. To counter these systemic threats, five policy recommendations are offered: (1) a national coordination and intelligence‑sharing architecture; (2) mandatory, risk‑based security standards with tiered personnel screening; (3) a public‑private resilience fund for replacing high‑risk equipment and diversifying supply chains; (4) enhanced transparency and international alignment; and (5) a strategy of managed interdependence that delineates safe engagement domains while leveraging reciprocal economic leverage. The document combines sector‑level case studies, quantitative industry data, and concrete legislative and institutional proposals aimed at Dutch policymakers, industry leaders, and security analysts.
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China’s Multi‑Domain Interference Strategy and Interference‑Chain Framework
Based on the CKN – Beyond Borders report, this analysis maps China’s multi‑domain interference tactics onto Dutch strategic industries using the Interference‑Chain methodology, detailing motivations, entry points, scenarios, and risk assessment.