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The paper investigates how decentralized blockchain technologies can be harnessed to govern digital commons, using Elinor Ostrom’s eight design principles as an analytical lens. It surveys a wide range of governance mechanisms—token‑weighted voting, delegated voting, quadratic voting, reputation‑based voting, Soulbound Tokens, and rotating councils—highlighting how each aligns or conflicts with Ostrom’s criteria for sustainable common‑pool resource management. Through detailed case studies (MolochDAO, MakerDAO, Commons Stack, Aragon, Optimism Collective, KlimaDAO, Regen Network, Axie Infinity, among others) the authors illustrate both the promise of transparent, community‑driven decision‑making and the recurring pitfalls of plutocratic concentration, voter apathy, and collusion. The paper further examines the socio‑economic and geopolitical dimensions of blockchain expansion, arguing that without careful design the technology can reproduce neo‑colonial power structures, exacerbate digital inequality, and impose severe environmental costs (energy‑intensive mining, crypto‑parasitism, virtual land grabs). Legal and regulatory analyses cover emerging frameworks such as Wyoming’s DAO LLC statute, the Ooki DAO court ruling, the EU’s MiCA regulation, and crypto‑friendly jurisdictions in Switzerland and Singapore, underscoring the tension between decentralization and juridical accountability. The authors propose a “dual imperative”: (1) develop context‑sensitive, inclusive governance architectures that blend algorithmic enforcement with human deliberation, and (2) pursue international legal recognition and standards to safeguard the emancipatory potential of blockchain‑based commons. The conclusion calls for empirical research on participation dynamics, AI‑assisted governance, and hybrid legal entities to guide the evolution of DAOs toward democratic, sustainable, and legally coherent digital commons.
Topics
Ostrom’s Principles as a Framework for Blockchain‑Based Digital Commons
Application of the eight Ostrom design principles (boundary definition, collective‑choice, monitoring, sanctions, conflict resolution, nested institutions, etc.) to evaluate blockchain governance models.
Tokenization Models and Their Governance Implications
Survey of token‑weighted voting, delegated voting, quadratic voting, reputation‑based voting, Soulbound Tokens, and rotating councils, with discussion of how each model maps onto Ostrom’s criteria.
Case Studies of DAO Governance: Successes and Shortcomings
In‑depth examination of specific DAOs (MolochDAO, MakerDAO, Commons Stack, Aragon, Optimism Collective, KlimaDAO, Regen Network, Axie Infinity) highlighting governance structures, participation metrics, and alignment with commons principles.
Legal and Regulatory Landscape for DAOs
Overview of emerging legal regimes (Wyoming DAO LLC, Ooki DAO ruling, EU MiCA, Swiss and Singapore frameworks) and their implications for DAO legitimacy and decentralization.
Socio‑Economic and Neo‑Colonial Dynamics of Blockchain Expansion
Analysis of how blockchain deployment can reinforce global inequality, digital colonialism, and surveillance, especially in the Global South and authoritarian contexts.
Environmental Impacts and Crypto‑Parasitism
Discussion of energy‑intensive proof‑of‑work mining, local infrastructure strain, virtual land grabs, and e‑waste, illustrated with Chelan County and Dresden case studies.
Play‑to‑Earn Gaming and Labor Precarity
Evaluation of Axie Infinity and the broader P2E model, highlighting income volatility, security breaches, and exploitation concerns.